Steven Trebach, CLS ’22

Having a criminal record is, in the United States, a clear detriment to one’s employability.[1] Given the makeup of the American prison system, this disadvantage to ex-felons face likely falls most heavily on the African-American community, which experiences a far higher rate of incarceration than other communities.[2]  This dynamic has become so explicitly racialized, that certain strategies, such as “Ban the Box ” which stop employers from requiring applicants to disclose a criminal record may have backfired.[3] Employers, wanting to avoid hiring people with felony records, assume African American men have undisclosed criminal records and avoid hiring them[4] In this context, the Second Circuit determined not to rehear en banc the case Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc.[5]

Mandala and Barnett (Plaintiffs), African-American men with past criminal records, were denied positions they had previously been offered at NTT Data, Inc. (NTT) in 2017 because of their criminal records.[6] In response, they brought a class action lawsuit against NTT, alleging the company had violated Title VII for racial discrimination.[7] Refusing to hire formerly incarcerated people, these Plaintiffs argue, “disqualifies a disproportionate number of African-American applicants” because of their aforementioned disproportionate rate of incarceration.[8] Despite the Plaintiffs proffering the statistical data demonstrating the higher rate of arrest and incarceration of African-Americans, when pleading their case, “the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.”[9]  A 2-1 split panel of the Second Circuit would go on to uphold this ruling, indicating “it is error for Plaintiffs to simply presume that population-level statistics will accurately describe subgroups of that population,” specifically the subgroup of people qualified to work at NTT.[10]

The Second Circuit’s decision not to rehear this case en banc raised dissent beyond the original dissenting judge.[11] In addition to including reiterations of the statistical disparities in criminalization of African Americans,[12] a major crux of the dissent was that the panel majority was willing to make “inferences favoring the Defendants while declining to make obvious inferences for Plaintiffs that would rebut the central basis of the panel majority’s reasoning,” thus incorrectly applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).[13] The ultimate fear is that the panel has created a higher than usual standard for pleading that threatens to founder valid civil rights litigation for failure to state a claim.[14]
The ABA Journal article that drew the attention of this Journal to the case seems to be firmly on the side of the dissent, ending the article with a dissenting judge’s statement that “the panel majority ‘uses a statistical sleight of hand to hide the clear implications of NTT’s blanket policy.’”[15]  While there is likely some truth to the dissent’s assertion, the potential problem may not be as far reaching as the dissent fears.

The panel and several other circuit judges, in a concurring opinion, respond to the dissent’s fears in a manner that seems to narrow the ultimate significance of the ruling to the specific facts of the Plaintiffs’ pleading. For example, a major crux of the dissent was that the panel erroneously narrowed what should be considered NTT’s applicant pool, relative to the general population.[16] The concurrence indicates, however, that the Plaintiffs’ complaint had, in fact, suggested the range of viable candidates for the position was narrower than the general population.[17] Thus, although this individual case may have been a step backward in the struggle to mitigate the burden of post-incarceration life on the African-American community, it could very well be a limited one.

 

 

           

[1] Binyamin Appelbaum, Out of Trouble, but Criminal Records Keep Men Out of Work, The New York Times, Feb. 28, 2015.

[2] John Gramlich, Black imprisonment rate in the U.S. has fallen by a third since 2006, Pew Research Center – Fact Tank,  May 6, 2020 (African-American are incarcerated at a rate roughly seven times per capita higher than white Americans, and almost twice as high as Hispanic Americans).

[3] Casey Leins, More Data Needed to Determine Whether ‘Ban the Box’ Laws Work, U.S. News and World Report, Sept. 10, 2019 (“Some studies show that ban the box laws could actually have a negative impact: When employers aren’t allowed to ask about applicants’ criminal background early in the hiring process, they may be more likely to assume certain applicants – especially black and Hispanic men – have a criminal history, denying jobs to qualified applicants who don’t have a criminal history.”).

[4] See Id.

[5] See Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., No. 19-2308-cv (2d Cir. Feb. 23, 2021).

[6] See Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., 975 F.3d 202, 205-06 (2d Cir. 2020).

[7] See id. at 206.

[8] Id.

[9] See Id. 

[10] Id. at 211.

[11] See Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., No. 19-2308-cv (2d Cir. Feb. 23, 2021).

[12] See id. (p.7 of Judge Chin’s dissent).

[13] See id. (p.1 of Judge Pooler’s dissent).

[14] See id. (p.1 of Judge Chin’s dissent).

[15] Debra C. Weiss, 2nd Circuit won’t consider reinstating suit alleging refusal to hire felons amounts to hiring bias, ABA Journal, Feb. 24, 2021.

[16] See Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., No. 19-2308-cv (2d Cir. Feb. 23, 2021) (p.27 of Judge Chin’s dissent).

[17]  See id. (pp. 2-3 of concurrence).

Arthur Schoen, CLS ’22

On March 11, 2021, Washington became the first state[1] to extend the constitutional protection against mandatory life sentences without parole to individuals older than 18. In a ground-breaking 5-4 ruling, the Supreme Court of Washington held that the state’s aggravated murder statute, which carries a mandatory penalty of life without parole for adult offenders, was unconstitutional as applied to individuals between the ages of 18 and 21.[2]

 

In 2012, the United States Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama[3] that mandatory sentences of life without parole are unconstitutional when applied to individuals younger than 18, finding that such statutes violate the Eight Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishments.[4] Instead, said the court, judges sentencing minor defendants must be allowed to exercise their discretion to craft an individualized sentence that considers the mitigating qualities of youth[5] – though the judge still may assign the full range of non-death-penalty punishments, including a sentence of life without parole. In 2018, the Washington Supreme Court took this even further, barring any sentences of life without parole for minors.[6]

 

Washington’s aggravated murder statute – amended in 2014 to fit with Miller’s guidelines[7] – provides for a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole for anyone aged 18 and older who is convicted of aggravated murder in the state of Washington, and a range of possible penalties for minors.[8]

 

In this case, Washington’s Supreme Court held that under both the Eight Amendment and Washington’s state constitutional prohibition on cruel punishments,[9] the holding of Miller should be extended to cover convicted murderers aged 18-20 as well.[10] The court provided several grounds for this landmark ruling. The court cited neuroscience research indicating that there is no meaningful difference in maturity between 17 and 18-year-olds,[11] and that mental development continues into a person’s 20s.[12] Though no other state has banned mandatory life without parole for offenders aged 18-20,[13] the court cited criminal statutes from several other states that provide for differentiated penalties for individuals in their 20s on account of their youth.[14] The court also pointed out that the age of majority in the United States used to be 21,[15] and that some states continue to use 21 as the cut-off point;[16] moreover, even Washington’s own laws feature flexibility in different contexts regarding at what age a child becomes an adult.[17]

 

In a dissenting opinion here, Justice Susan Owens strongly disagreed with the court’s extension of the Miller rule. Pointing out the many contexts in which 18-year-olds are considered adults by the law, Justice Owens argued that there are no grounds to distinguish between youthful adults and other adults for purposes of mandatory minimum sentences.[18] In addition to various constitutional arguments, the dissent contended that the determination of adulthood is best left to a legislature – which has the capacity to review all the necessary evidence and considerations – rather than a court, which is “insufficiently equipped to decide this issue on selectively presented evidence put forth by limited parties on a constrained schedule.”[19]

 

The two petitioners in this case were both convicted of brutal murders and sentenced to life without parole under Washington’s aggravated murder statute. The first, Dwayne Bartholomew, was convicted in 1981 for shooting the attendant of a gas station he was robbing; he was 20 years old.[20] The second, Kurtis Monschke, participated in the vicious group murder of a homeless person as part of an initiation into a white supremacist gang.  He was 19 when he committed that murder and he was convicted in 2003.[21] In granting their petition, the court ordered that Bartholomew and Monschke would each receive a new sentencing hearing that takes into account the petitioners’ ages at the time they committed those murders.[22]

 

Of course, it remains to be seen whether other states and courts might consider following Washington’s lead and doing away with mandatory sentences of life without parole for offenders aged 18-20. Though there have been voices arguing for such measures in the years since the Supreme Court’s Miller decision,[23] courts have not proven receptive to the argument until now, as numerous petitions citing Miller to argue for reconsideration of sentences given to 18-20-year-olds have been denied.[24] In 2018, the federal court in the District of Connecticut actually did grant one such petition, vacating a mandatory life without parole sentence for an 18-year-old as unconstitutional under the Eight Amendment;[25] however, the Second Circuit overturned that holding on appeal last year.[26] Now that Washington has come down strongly in favor of the efforts to extend Miller to the 18-20 age bracket, perhaps the legislatures and courts in other jurisdictions might be more willing to follow suit.

 

 

[1] In re Pers. Restraint of Monschke, 2021 Wash. LEXIS 152 at *43 (Mar. 11, 2021) (Owens, J., dissenting). See also Gene Johnson, Court Overturns Automatic Life Sentences for Young Killers, Seattle Times (Mar. 11, 2021), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/washington-state-supreme-court-overturns-automatic-life-sentences-for-young-killers/.

[2] In re Pers. Restraint of Monschke, 2021 Wash. LEXIS 152 (Mar. 11, 2021).

[3] Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).

[4] See U.S. Const. Amend. VIII.

[5] Miller, 567 U.S. at 489.

[6] State v. Bassett, 192 Wn.2d 67 (2018).

[7] Monschke, 2021 Wash. LEXIS 152 at *18 n.15.

[8] Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.95.030 (2015).

[9] Wash. Const. Art. I, § 14.

[10] Monschke, 2021 Wash. LEXIS 152 at *7-*8, *29.

[11] Id. at *19.

[12] Id. at *19-*20.

[13] See supra note 1.

[14] In re Pers. Restraint of Monschke, 2021 Wash. LEXIS 152 at *8 n.8 (Mar. 11, 2021).

[15] Id. at *9.

[16] Id. at *10 n.9.

[17] Id. at *16-*18.

[18] Id. at *30-31 (J. Owens, dissenting).

[19] Id. at *31 (J. Owens, dissenting).

[20] Id. at *2. See also Richard Carelli, High Court Reinstates Tacoma Man’s Murder Conviction, Associated Press (Oct. 10, 1995), https://apnews.com/article/16469a0184bfe4e74ecac1a31d8f73b9.

[21] In re Pers. Restraint of Monschke, 2021 Wash. LEXIS 152 at *2 (Mar. 11, 2021). See also Jeffrey M. Barker, White Supremacist Gets Life for Killing Homeless Man, Seattle Post-Intelligencer (June 1, 2004) (updated Mar. 15, 2011), https://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/White-supremacist-gets-life-for-killing-homeless-1146209.php.

[22] Monschke, 2021 Wash. LEXIS 152 at *29.

[23] See, e.g., Emily Powell, Underdeveloped and Over-Sentenced: Why Eighteen- to Twenty-Year-Olds Should Be Exempt from Life Without Parole, 52 U. Rich. L. Rev. Online 83 (2018). See also Juvenile Sentencing Project, Consideration of Youth for Young Adults (Jan. 2020), https://juvenilesentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/model_reforms_consideration_of_youth_for_young_adults.pdf.

[24] See, e.g., Meas v. Lizarraga, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184672 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2016); see further Cruz v. United States, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52924 at *41 (D. Conn. Mar. 29, 2018) (listing several cases). See also, however, State v. Norris, 2017 WL 2062145 at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 15, 2017) (the court recognized that mandatory life without parole might not give 21-year-olds the opportunity for full consideration of mitigating age-related factors).

[25] Cruz, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52924 at *41 (D. Conn. Mar. 29, 2018).

[26] Cruz v. United States, 826 F. App’x 49 (2d Cir. 2020).

 

Josie Wexler, CLS ’22

As COVID-19 began to spread, governors and local officials started to publicly disagree on restrictions. Governors in many states, including Florida, Georgia, and Mississippi, released orders meant to supplant local orders.[1] This trend has continued throughout the pandemic. In New York, when Mayor de Blasio announced a plan for closures in certain parts of Brooklyn and Queens, Governor Cuomo stepped in to overrule him and announced a new plan.[2] Cuomo’s broad emergency powers, granted by the New York Legislature, preempted de Blasio’s authority on certain issues, including lockdowns.[3] In most states, state law creates a similar balance of power between the governor and local officials during the pandemic.[4]

 

The easing of COVID-19 restrictions is once again calling attention to these conflicts. A number of states have ended their statewide mask mandates, but not all local officials want to do so. In Texas, state officials and the local officials of Austin and the surrounding Travis County are in the midst of a legal battle over a mask mandate. Texas Governor Greg Abbott announced the end of his state’s mask mandate in early March 2021. His Executive Order forbids “any jurisdiction” from requiring individuals to wear a mask unless a certain hospitalization threshold is reached.[5] Nonetheless, officials in Austin and Travis County continued to require masks.[6]

 

Despite pressure from the Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton to end the mandate, local officials refused to back down. Attorney General Paxton then filed suit.[7] Travis County Judge Lora Livingston initially denied the State’s request for a temporary restraining order, setting a hearing date for two weeks later.[8] At the hearing, the State argued that the Texas Disaster Act, which gave the Governor authority over the crisis response and his orders “the force and effect of law,” superseded the conflicting local mandate.[9] Local officials argued the Texas Health and Safety Code, which allows local officials to adopt public health measures, was not preempted under the Act.[10] Judge Livingston declined to grant an injunction, expressing skepticism that the Governor’s authority under the Act gave him overriding authority.[11]

 

Attorney General Paxton is expected to appeal,[12] and it seems likely that he could eventually win. The Texas Supreme Court previously overturned rulings from lower courts that allowed Austin and Travis County to prohibit dine-in service at bars and restaurants on New Year’s Eve, a restriction in conflict with an Executive Order allowing such service.[13]

 

As restrictions ease and people “return to normal,” it is likely that the disagreements between governors and local officials will continue. The pandemic has highlighted these issues, and it may have long-lasting repercussions on the balance of power between state and local authorities.[14]

[1] Sheila R. Foster, As COVID-19 Proliferates Mayors Take Response Lead, Sometimes in Conflicts with Their Governors, The Georgetown Law Project on State and Local Governmental Policy and Law, https://www.law.georgetown.edu/salpal/as-covid-19-proliferates-mayors-take-response-lead-sometimes-in-conflicts-with-their-governors/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2021). For a further discussion of how the balance between state and local governments work, see id.

[2] Jesse McKinley, & et al., How a Feud Between Cuomo and de Blasio Led to a Chaotic Virus Crackdown, N.Y. Times, (Oct. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/12/nyregion/cuomo-coronavirus-orthodox-shutdown.html.

[3] See NY Legislature Votes to Repeal Cuomo’s Pandemic Emergency Powers, NBC New York (Mar. 5, 2021), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/politics/ny-legislators-poised-to-remove-gov-cuomos-pandemic-emergency-powers/2925931/.

[4] See Foster, supra note 1.

[5] Tex. Executive Order No. GA-34 (Mar. 2, 2021), https://open.texas.gov/uploads/files/organization/opentexas/EO-GA-34-opening-Texas-response-to-COVID-disaster-IMAGE-03-02-2021.pdf.

[6] Audrey McNamara, Texas Attorney General Sues Austin for Refusing to Lift Mask Mandate, CBS News (Mar. 12, 2021), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mask-mandate-ken-paxton-texas-attorney-general-sues-austin-for-refusing-to-lift/.

[7] Attorney General Ken Paxton (@KenPaxtonTX), Twitter (Mar. 11, 2021, 3:25 PM), https://twitter.com/KenPaxtonTX/status/1370108518104174600.

[8] Jordan William, Judge Sides with Austin in Texas Mask Lawsuit, The Hill, (Mar. 12, 2021) https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/542990-judge-sides-with-austin-in-texas-mask-lawsuit?rl=1.

[9] Chuck Lindell, Judge Allows Austin Mask Mandate to Continue, Rejecting Texas AG Ken Paxton’s Arguments, Austin American-Statesman (Mar. 26, 2021), https://www.statesman.com/story/news/2021/03/26/austin-mask-mandate-continues-texas-ken-paxton-rejected/7011102002/.

[10] Id.

[11] Connor Perrett, A Judge Ruled Austin Can Continue to Enforce Mask Mandate After the Texas Attorney General Sued to Stop It, Business Insider (Mar. 27, 2021), https://www.businessinsider.com/austin-mask-mandate-judge-sides-against-texas-governor-2021-3.

[12] Id.

[13] Nadia Chaudhury, How the State of Texas Worked to Block Austin’s New Year’s Dine-In Curfew, Eater (Jan. 5, 2021), https://austin.eater.com/2021/1/5/22213624/austin-nye-dining-curfew-blocked-texas-state-coronavirus.

[14] See Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 Stanford Law Review 1995 (2018) for a discussion of how state preemption over local law has changed in the last decade.

 

Julia Levitan, CLS ’22

On November 12, 2020, the First Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Harvard University in a high-profile affirmative action case.[1] The plaintiff, Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA), has already announced its intention to bring its suit against Harvard to the Supreme Court.[2]  If the Supreme Court does choose to hear the Harvard case, or any of the other SFFA lawsuits currently in the lower courts, the increasingly conservative Court could revisit and possibly upend the established affirmative action jurisprudence that dates back to the 1970s.[3] Under the current standard, a school’s admissions process can consider race as one factor in a multi-factor, holistic evaluation of applications in the interest of achieving the educational benefits of a diverse student body.[4] A school cannot engage in “racial balancing” or use quotas in admissions.[5]

The case began in 2014, when SFFA, a group founded by “anti-affirmative-action activist” Edward Blum, filed suit against Harvard College, alleging that the school’s undergraduate admissions process discriminates against Asian American applicants in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.[6]  The plaintiffs argued that the college engages in impermissible racial balancing and relies too heavily on race as the dominant factor in the school’s admissions program.[7]  Harvard defended against these claims by arguing that its admissions process involves a “holistic” review that does not overemphasize or too heavily weigh the race of the applicant.[8] The first victory for Harvard came in 2019, when a district court judge found that the college’s admission program survives strict scrutiny, that is, that the school’s use of race is “narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest.”[9] The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Harvard’s admission process does not violate Title VI.

But the First Circuit decision is unlikely to be the end of the road for the Harvard case, or for SFFA’s litigation battles against affirmative action policies. The Harvard case is one of many lawsuits the group is pursuing challenging affirmative action policies at institutions of higher education.[10]

[1] Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., No. 19-2005, 2020 WL 6604313 (1st Cir. Nov. 12, 2020).

[2]  Benjamin L. Fu & Dohyun Kim, What to Expect Next in the Harvard Admissions Suit, The Harvard Crimson (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2020/10/13/harvard-sffa-next-steps.

[3] See Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 578 U.S. __ (2016) (slip op), Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).

[4] Fisher, 136 U.S. at 13.

[5] Id. at 7.

[6] Students for Fair Admissions, 2020 WL 6604313, at *1.

[7] Id. at *22-25.

[8] Id.

[9] Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 397 F. Supp. 3d 126, 191 (D. Mass. 2019), aff’d sub nom. Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., No. 19-2005, 2020 WL 6604313 (1st Cir. Nov. 12, 2020).

[10] See Anemona Hartocollis, Affirmative Action Cases May Reach Supreme Court Even Without Trump, N.Y. Times (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/09/us/affirmative-action-north-carolina.html.

Madeline Holbrook, CLS ’22

The rapid spread of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) induced governments all over the world to create emergency safety measures in an attempt to slow the transmission between people.[1] In the United States, the most stringent of these safety measures are shelter-in-place orders, otherwise known as stay-at-home orders or lockdowns.[2] These measures are created by state governments, which direct citizens to stay in their homes as much as possible—and force “non-essential” businesses to close for the duration of the order.[3]

The state of Pennsylvania lived under one such order beginning on March 21, 2020.[4] On May 7, 2020, citizens and business owners from several different counties in Pennsylvania filed a lawsuit, County of Butler v. Wolf, in the Western District of Pennsylvania alleging that the stay-at-home order violated two Constitutional rights: the First Amendment right to assemble; and the fourteenth amendment right to substantive and procedural due process.[5]

On September 14, 2020, the district court ruled that stay-at-home orders violate the First Amendment right to assemble and the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law.[6] The court applied intermediate scrutiny to the restrictions. To pass intermediate scrutiny, a law must further an important government interest and do so by means substantially related to that interest. The court found that the restrictions were undertaken in support of a significant government interest: containing and managing the effects of COVID-19.[7] However, the government may not regulate free speech or free assembly in such a manner that a substantial part of the burden does not reach the government’s goals.[8] In short, stay-at-home orders are not a narrowly tailored solution to the problem. “A statute is narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more than the exact source of the “evil” it seeks to remedy.”[9] The court found that shelter-in-place orders impose too heavy a burden on citizens—taking away an express constitutional right—to solve too narrow a problem.

Turning to the Fourteenth Amendment analysis, the court also ruled that stay-at-home orders violate substantive due process.[10] Courts have long recognized the right of citizens to be out and about in public. [11] Lockdowns deny citizens of this right and create a default position of being kept inside. While governments are authorized to take emergency measures to preserve the public health, the court ruled that the timeline for such measures has been long exceeded.[12] The court ruled that the government is required to find a less burdensome means to mitigate the effects of COVID-19.[13] In short, while lockdowns may be acceptable in the short term, in the long term they are not a sufficiently narrowly tailored solution to the public health problem as to be found constitutional.

“Broad population-wide lockdowns are such a dramatic inversion of the concept of liberty in a free society as to be nearly presumptively unconstitutional unless the government can truly demonstrate that they burden no more liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve an important government end.”[14] In a case where liberty and safety go head-to-head, the Western District of Pennsylvania came down on the side of liberty.

[1] Jacob Gershman, A Guide to State Coronavirus Reopenings and Lockdowns, Wall St. J. (May 20, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-state-by-state-guide-to-coronavirus-lockdowns-11584749351.

[2] Id.

[3] Id.

[4] Cty. of Butler v. Wolf, Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-677, 2020 WL 5510690, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Sep. 14, 2020).

[5] Cty. of Butler v. Wolf, Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-677, 2020 WL 2769105, at *2 (W.D. Pa. May 28, 2020).

[6] Cty. of Butler v. Wolf, Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-677, 2020 WL 5510690, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Sep. 14, 2020).

[7] Id. at 14.

[8] Id. at 45.

[9] Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988).

[10] Cty. of Butler v. Wolf, Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-677, 2020 WL 5510690, at *16 (W.D. Pa. Sep. 14, 2020).

[11] City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1999); Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164-165 (1972); Byofsky v. Middletown, 429 U.S. 964 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

[12] Cty. of Butler v. Wolf, Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-677, 2020 WL 5510690, at *62 (W.D. Pa. Sep. 14, 2020).

[13] Id. at 23.

[14] Id. at 72-73.

Paul Riley, CLS ’22

2020 marks 55 years since the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (the “VRA”) and the year that John Lewis, a civil rights icon, was laid to rest.[1] Many will never forget the footage of John Lewis and other non-violent protestors being brutalized by police as they marched for their right to vote on March 7, 1965. Often referred to as “Bloody Sunday,” the scenes from the Edmund Pettus Bridge in Selma, Alabama rocked the collective conscience of the nation and President Lyndon B. Johnson. Enacted into law on August 6, 1965, the VRA prohibits any measures that would prevent racial minorities from participating in the electoral process.[2] More specifically, Section 2 of the VRA (“§ 2”) prohibits, “any standards, practices, or procedures” that abridge racial or language minorities’ voting rights.[3] However, the Supreme Court’s continual narrowing down of the scope of § 2 claims has limited minority groups’ ability to seek adequate relief under the VRA.

 

The Supreme Court’s desire to narrow the scope of § 2 claims is perhaps most apparent in its City of Mobile, Alabama v. Bolden decision. In Mobile, the Court held that § 2 violations “required proof that the contested electoral practice or mechanism was adopted or maintained with the intent to discriminate against minority voters.”[4] Given that intent is extremely difficult to prove, Congress repudiated Mobile in its 1982 VRA Amendments ­– which rejected the Court’s “intent” test and now only required plaintiffs to show that an electoral practice had a discriminatory result.[5] With this new guidance, the Supreme Court, in Thornburg v. Gingles, established three preconditions for plaintiffs hoping to mount a § 2 claim. The minority group must be able to demonstrate that: (1) “it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district,” (2) “it is politically cohesive,” and (3) “the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it…usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.”[6]

 

Put simply, the Supreme Court notes that, “[u]nder § 2…the injury is vote dilution.”[7] Further, the Supreme Court has outlined two main types of vote dilution: (1) “the dispersal of blacks into districts in which they constitute an ineffective minority of voters,” and (2) “the concentration of blacks into districts where they constitute an excessive majority.”[8] Despite these two definitions of “vote dilution,” the Supreme Court has precluded plaintiffs from making “influence-dilution” or “vote-packing” claims under this latter definition. In League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, the Supreme Court held that § 2 does not require the creation of “influence districts” – districts “in which a minority group can influence the outcome of an election even if its preferred candidate cannot be elected.”[9] Similarly, the Supreme Court, in Bartlett v. Strickland, held that § 2 does not require the creation of “crossover districts” – districts where the minority group’s influence is potentially large enough to elect their desired candidate with the support of white voters who cross over to add their support.[10] Without these “influence” and “crossover” districts, there is essentially no remedy available for vote-packing claims under § 2.

 

The Supreme Court has demonstrated an unwillingness to create cognizable vote-packing claims because it fears that doing so will obliterate its Gingles preconditions ­– which have been the baseline and bedrock of its § 2 jurisprudence.[11] However, the evolution of the Supreme Court’s § 2 jurisprudence (with respect to vote-packing) has been anything but clear.[12] Congress should resolve this tension by specifically creating a vote-packing claim under § 2. In doing so, Congress could compel the courts to establish a judicial framework to protect this other form of vote dilution, put state legislatures on notice as they craft future redistricting plans, and, perhaps most importantly, provide minorities – excessively packed into these districts – with some form of relief under the VRA.

[1] N.J. Admin. Code § EX. ORD. No. 167 (2020) (“An Order Directing the U.S. and New Jersey Flags to Fly at Half-Staff in Honor of U.S. Representative John Lewis”).

[2] 52 U.S.C.A. § 10101.

[3] 52 U.S.C.A. § 10301 (“(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 10303(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b). (b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.”).

[4] Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44 (1986) (referencing City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980)).

[5] S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 36 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 214.

[6] Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50–51.

[7] League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 402 (2006).

[8] Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46 n.11.; Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153–54 (1993).

[9] Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 13 (2009) (referencing League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 445 (2006)).

[10] Id.

[11] Id. at 16.

[12] Voinovich, 507 U.S. at 154 (“We have not yet decided whether influence-dilution claims such as appellees’ are viable under § 2.”); Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 41 n.5 (1993); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46 n.11–12 (1986).

Michael Tinti, CLS ’22

In Woolslayer v. Driscoll, the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania ruled on the intersection between First Amendment speech rights and the COVID-19 pandemic.[1] The plaintiff worked as the Director of Facilities Operation for defendants Indiana University of Pennsylvania for four years, receiving positive reviews from his employers throughout his tenure.[2] This changed in March of 2020, when—as we are all painfully aware—the COVID-19 pandemic first fastened its grip on United States’ workplaces. Upon learning that the spouse of a fellow employee had contracted the virus, the plaintiff—against the express recommendation from his supervisors—informed his fellow coworkers of this over email, and suggested they seek medical consultation.[3] Plaintiff was fired on the grounds that his supervisors “had lost confidence in [plaintiff’s] ability to effectively perform his assigned duties…”[4] Plaintiff subsequently commenced his suit, alleging a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.[5] Defendant moved to dismiss.[6]

Under the Supreme Court jurisprudence, a government employee whose speech was the but-for cause of their termination can be protected under the First Amendment Free Speech Clause if the speech was made as a citizen, the subject matter of the speech was of public concern, and the government-employer’s interest in the efficient functioning of the workplace does not outweigh the employee’s free speech interest.[7] The district court dispatched with the second and third issues quickly; the context of the COVID-19 pandemic bolstered the court’s conclusion that plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern.[8]

The brunt of the district court’s First Amendment analysis, therefore, was focused on this first prong. Specifically, if plaintiff made his statements “pursuant to his official duties,” he would not be speaking as a citizen for First Amendment purposes.[9] The defendant pointed to the mode of plaintiff’s speech—an email sent from his work account exclusively to other university employees—as evidence the speech was made in plaintiff’s official capacity.[10] Yet the court dismissed this argument, finding that the mode of speech or its audience is not dispositive on the issue.[11] Rather, the court analyzed whether or not the plaintiff’s speech was “part of the work [he] was paid to perform on an ordinary basis.”[12] In his complaint, plaintiff asserted that his position did not grant him the power to speak in the name of a university policy maker, or to work in matters concerning the scope and nature of university functions.[13] Accepting these allegations as true, the court found that the plaintiff adequately plead he spoke as a citizen.

After finding that the plaintiff’s official capacity claim against the university president was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, the court concluded that the plaintiff had adequately plead a retaliation claim under the First Amendment. The defendant’s motion to dismiss was thus denied.

Though the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, the court’s reasoning is yet another indictment on the Garcetti jurisprudence. Paradoxically, an employee who has no professional responsibility to alert fellow employees of potential COVID exposure is protected by the First Amendment, yet an employee who does would not be protected, despite the clear public importance of performing such speech. Even if other state or federal statutes potentially protect against this form of retaliation, this critical chink in the First Amendment shield is troubling, to say the very least.

[1] 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186610 (W.D. Pa. 2020).

[2] Id at *2

[3] Id at *3.

[4] Id. at *3-4.

[5] Id. at *1.

[6] Id.

[7] See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).

[8] Woolslayer, supra at *10-11.

[9] Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421

[10] Woolslayer, supra at *8.

[11] Id. at *8-9.

[12] Id. (quoting De Ritis v. McGarrigle, 861 F.3d 444, 454 (3d Cir. 2017)).

[13] Woolslayer, supra at *9.

Mary Gardner, CLS ’22

When an NYPD officer abuses his authority, who holds him accountable? The short answer is: no one. After George Floyd and Breonna Taylor were murdered by police officers, millions of Americans risked the pandemic to protest police violence and push for comprehensive reform.[1] Local governments felt the pressure of civilian scrutiny. People across the country began to inquire with greater urgency—Who reviews police misconduct? Who disciplines officers? Who terminates officers who endanger civilians?

 

In New York City, the Civilian Complaint Review Board (“CCRB”) functions as the independent watchdog agency intended to increase police accountability by processing claims of misconduct and recommending disciplinary action to the Police Commissioner. The CCRB is comprised of civilian employees and has the power to “receive, investigate, mediate, hear, make findings, and recommend action on complaints against New York City police officers alleging the use of excessive or unnecessary force, abuse of authority, discourtesy, or the use of offensive language.”[2] Although the existence of an independent watchdog agency has been lauded as ‘progressive,’ New Yorkers have long wondered how the CCRB works—and if the CCRB works.

 

Over the summer, New York lawmakers passed a series of laws intended to increase police accountability and curb police violence.[3] This package included the repeal of 50-A, a law that shielded police disciplinary records from the public.[4] On August 20, 2020, 323,911 accusations of police misconduct were published by the New York Civil Liberties Union.[5] The data rings alarm bells.

 

Between 2001 and 2020, over 81,000 officers have received at least one complaint, but the CCRB has recommended disciplinary action for only 3,188.[6]  Of these, 798 received some kind of penalty or additional training and returned to their roles, and 890 were not disciplined at all.[7] In the last twenty years, only seven officers have been fired.[8]

 

The data tells us that NYPD Officer Michael Raso has fourteen substantiated allegations in eight separate complaints against him, but he has not been fired.[9] Officer David Leonardi has eleven substantiated allegations in seven separate complaints against him, but he remains on the force.[10] Officer Joseph Tallarine has 23 substantiated allegations in six separate complaints, but he has maintained his position and even earned several raises.[11]

 

Moderate liberals who favor gradual police reform—including President-Elect Joe Biden[12]—have long referred to violent officers as a “few bad apples.” The CCRB data demonstrates the New York City’s disciplinary measures systematically retain “bad apples” while creating the illusion of civilian oversight. The whole barrel is rotten.

 

Now that the failures of the CCRB are readily apparent, the path to reform should be clear. New York needs a civilian oversight agency that is truly led by civilians and has some teeth. Currently, the City Council selects five board members, the Mayor selects five, and the Police Commissioner selects three.[13] New York Mayors have long felt political pressure to appear ‘tough on crime,’ so the board members selected by the Mayor lean conservative. As a result, the communities most impacted by police violence remain severely underrepresented. If the CCRB is truly intended to represent the population, the Mayor’s five board seats should be elected by citizens in each borough. The current mayoral appointees are racially diverse, but lack socioeconomic diversity – three out of five are corporate lawyers.[14]

 

Furthermore, the CCRB should have the authority to actually discipline officers based on their findings. At the moment, the board can only recommend disciplinary action to the Police Commissioner who may disregard the recommendation completely if he chooses.[15] The new data demonstrates that the Police Commissioner follows the CCRB recommendation only twenty percent of the time.[16] The consequences of this design flaw are tremendous. Officers who engage in excessive force, sexual harassment, and abuse of authority, are often reprimanded by losing a few vacation days.[17] Giving the CCRB real disciplinary authority would give the organization a backbone. Taking disciplinary authority out from under the NYPD and placing it in the hands of democratically-elected CCRB is a necessary step in creating meaningful police accountability.

[1] Luis Ferré-Sadurní and Jesse McKinley, N.Y. Bans Chokeholds and Approves Other Measures to Restrict Police, N.Y. Times (June 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/nyregion/50a-repeal-police-floyd.html.

[2] CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/ccrb/about/about.page (last visited Nov. 21, 2020).

[3] See Ferré-Sadurní, supra note 1.

[4] Innocence Staff, In a Historic Victory, Governor Cuomo Signs Repeal of 50-A Into Law, Innocence Project (June 9, 2020), https://innocenceproject.org/in-a-historic-victory-the-new-york-legislature-repeals-50-a-requiring-full-disclosure-of-police-disciplinary-records/.

[5] Ashley Southall, 323,911 Accusations of N.Y.P.D. Misconduct Are Released Online, N.Y. Times (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/20/nyregion/nypd-ccrb-records-published.html.

[6] Ashley Southall, Ali Watkins and Blacki Migliozzi, A Watchdog Accused Officers of Serious Misconduct. Few Were Punished., N.Y. Times (Nov. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/15/nyregion/ccrb-nyc-police-misconduct.html.

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] George Joseph, Christopher Robbins, Jake Offenhartz and Jake Dobkin, Here Are the Current NYPD Officers with the Most Substantiated Misconduct Complaints, Gothamist (July 28, 2020, 1:32 PM), https://gothamist.com/news/here-are-current-nypd-officers-most-substantiated-misconduct-complaints.

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] Reid J. Epstein and John Eligon, Biden Said, ‘Most Cops Are Good.’ But Progressives Want Systemic Change., N.Y. Times (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/19/us/politics/democrats-biden-defund-police.html.

[13] See CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD, supra note 2.

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

[16] See Southall, supra note 5.

[17] See Joseph, supra note 8.