Columbia Journal of Law & Social Problems

Student Written, Student Edited

The Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems (JLSP) (Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs.) is a general-interest legal journal whose mission is to remind readers of the law’s responsibility to serve the public good. JLSP is entirely student written and student edited, and has been cited by the United States Supreme Court, federal appellate courts and district courts, and state supreme courts.

In Volume 58, Issue 1

Towing After Timbs: Why Vehicle Impoundment Violates the Excessive Fines Clause

Aliza M. Tresser

The plain text of the Eighth Amendment prohibits the government from punishing people with excessive fines. But until the Excessive Fines Clause was incorporated in 2019, it did not apply to municipal or state governments. In applying federal doctrine to the local context, many courts have not yet extended this guarantee to an obvious application: expensive traffic and parking tickets compounded by the exorbitant costs associated with towed cars or losing the car altogether at a lien sale. While towing companies are third-party contractors, this Note argues that because police authorize the towing companies to tow private vehicles and fine their owners, these punishments fall within the bounds of the Excessive Fines Clause. Additionally, whether fines related to car towing are excessive may depend on the financial circumstances of the car owner. What may be a manageable unplanned expense for one person is not so for others and can throw families living in poverty into economic insecurity and instability. Given this exposure to instability, fines that are reasonable for one family are not for another. Though there is no explicit Eighth Amendment protection against arbitrary impoundments, there is legal momentum around the idea; a growing number of jurisdictions are finding Excessive Fines violations for vehicle impoundments. This Note presents a comprehensive analysis of the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause as applied to traffic and parking violations, especially when it results in a car being towed without the consent of the owner.

When Parents Decide That All the World’s a Stage: Expanding Publicity Rights to Protect Children in Monetized Social Media Content

Celine Simone

Family content creation is a multibillion-dollar industry. Though most parents at some point share content of their children online, for many “influencer” parents and their children, putting in the hours to curate the perfect online image means legions of fans and an enviable income from advertising and sponsorship. The children of these families, though integral to this content’s success, have neither legal protection to assure compensation for their labor nor any control over the material in which they appear. Creating this content can have detrimental effects on children’s safety and well-being; additionally, because of the internet’s permanence, these negative effects often continue well into adulthood.

Several states have passed or proposed laws that would ensure some level of financial compensation for children involved in monetized content. A far less discussed—but perhaps equally important—potential form of protection is the “Right to Deletion,” whereupon turning 18 these children could command that their parents remove monetized media that includes their likeness. In the United States, parents enjoy a high degree of autonomy in making decisions for their children, meaning it is exceedingly difficult to explicitly control the type of content parents can create involving their minor children. Accordingly, this Note advocates for a national expansion of publicity rights, which would give children included in monetized content a “Right to Deletion” upon reaching adulthood— respecting parental autonomy while curbing the long-term negative effects of “sharenting” on the involved children. Further, deletion rights may have the effect of persuading parents to consider more carefully the potentially harmful effects of the content they produce without encroaching on their parental rights.

Part I of this Note outlines the family content creation industry, its unique characteristics compared to traditional forms of media, and the harms that can befall children in its production. Part II evaluates the United States’ legal understanding of parental autonomy and how this view leaves these children at an especially high risk of exploitation. Part III addresses the state of publicity laws and where children involved in monetized content fit into the existing legal framework. Finally, Part IV advocates for the expansion of publicity rights to give these children the “Right to Deletion” upon entering adulthood.

Epic Games Played by the Rule of Reason: Rebalancing Antitrust’s Improbable Standard

Jay S. Burgin

When mobile app developers like Epic Games—creator of the massively popular online video game Fortnite—make their product available on Apple’s App Store, they enter the “walled garden,” a closed digital ecosystem wherein iPhone and iPad users cannot download games through other digital marketplaces. They also agree to Apple’s “antisteering“ provision: developers cannot attempt to steer consumers away from the App Store to purchase the same game on the developer’s website, often for lower prices. In 2023, the Ninth Circuit held in Epic Games v. Apple that antitrust challenges to digital download tying arrangements like these should be judged under the defendant-friendly rule of reason standard, rather than by categorical presumptions. Though Apple ultimately evaded antitrust liability, the court struck down antisteering provision as “unfair” under California state competition law. This (minor) equitable relief did little to unseat the tech giant’s continued dominance over digital marketplaces. Yet the ruling in Epic Games accomplished what may prove to be significant: the circuit court held that trial courts applying rule of reason analysis must apply the underutilized—even neglected—balancing stage of the rule of reason.

This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Epic Games reflects an emerging quagmire in antitrust law. As courts become more comfortable in applying the rule of reason standard in software industry tying claims, demonstrating clear anticompetitive practices may not be enough to prevail where, not only are there ever-ready procompetitive justifications for such practices, but the rule of reason as a process does not allow plaintiffs to pass go—regardless of the merits. The requirement that courts engage in fourth-stage balancing may relieve the doctrine of its implausible propensity to find non-liability and resolve inherent contradictions between findings of fact and outcomes as a matter of law. Post-Epic Games, if antitrust law is to remain salient in regulation of the platform software industry, courts must engage more seriously in balancing—or rather, re-balancing—a broader set of non-economic considerations and redirect courts toward the original conception of antitrust law as protector of the competitive process.

Obscenity Revisited: Defending Recent Age-Verification Laws Against First Amendment Challenges

Daniel S. Anduze

On July 2, 2024, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton—a case involving a First Amendment challenge to Texas H.B. 1181. That statute, aimed at limiting youth exposure to sexual material online, requires pornography companies to verify that their users are at least 18 years old. Since 2023, 18 other states have enacted nearly identical age-verification laws with surprisingly bipartisan majorities. As of this Note’s publication, analogous legislation is pending in at least 17 additional states. But according to the pornography industry, because these laws burden substantial amounts of protected speech, courts must apply strict scrutiny—a demanding standard which the laws allegedly cannot survive, especially in the wake of Reno v. ACLU and Ashcroft v. ACLU II.

This Note challenges that argument. It argues that recent age-verification laws pose no serious First Amendment concerns and should be upheld against the industry’s legal challenges. Contrary to the industry’s suggestions, recent age-verification laws were carefully crafted to avoid the constitutional pitfalls of the provisions of the Communications Decency Act and the Child Online Protection Act that were invalidated in Reno and Ashcroft II. The recent legislation—including Texas H.B. 1181, the focus of this Note—represents a concerted effort by state legislators of all political stripes to incorporate the judicial guidance previously provided by the Supreme Court. While this Note is sympathetic to a majority of the government’s proffered defenses of the laws—involving the obscenity exception to the First Amendment and rational basis review under Ginsberg v. New York—it ultimately concludes that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review under existing precedent. Texas H.B. 1181, and all analogous laws, still survive this demanding standard of review because they (1) serve the compelling governmental interest of protecting children from online pornography, (2) are narrowly tailored to achieve that interest, and (3) are the least restrictive means of advancing it, notwithstanding the availability of parental-led content filtering software.

Part I of this Note describes the history of recent age-verification legislation and the modern reemergence of anti-pornography sentiments. It then analyzes the statutory requirements of age-verification laws, particularly of Texas H.B. 1181. The remainder of Part I recounts the history of obscenity jurisprudence in the United States and contemporary Congressional attempts to regulate sexual content on the internet. Part II considers a variety of defenses of the laws. It first examines whether the laws can be upheld under the obscenity exception to the First Amendment. It then contemplates the appropriate standard of review and analyzes whether H.B. 1181 survives the relevant tiers of constitutional scrutiny. Part III explores potential avenues for the Supreme Court to revisit its obscenity jurisprudence in light of original understandings of the First Amendment and consistent state practices following its ratification.