In Volume 57, Issue 4
In the Shadow of the Bench: Judicial Discretion to Reject Plea Agreements
Dylan R. McDonough
In 2021, over 98% of criminal cases at the federal level terminated in guilty pleas, many of which were the result of plea agreements between the prosecution and the defense. The numbers were similar at the state level. Despite this prevalence of plea agreements, many U.S. jurisdictions limit the role that judges may play in providing oversight in the plea negotiation process. At the federal level—and in at least 14 states—judicial participation in the plea-bargaining process is entirely prohibited. In those jurisdictions, judges have one tool for oversight: judicial discretion to reject plea agreements. On the rare occasions in which judges use this tool, the reasons for rejecting plea agreements vary widely. Some cite issues with sentencing leniency, others point to the need for the participation of the public or alleged victims in the legal process, and still others raise concerns around legislative intent, police officers’ views, or appellate waivers. However, the exact contours of that discretion remain ill-defined. The reasons for rejection given by different judges sometimes conflict, and the rarity of memorialized rejections means little caselaw has developed on the subject. This, in turn, has created a lack of predictability for parties in the plea-bargaining process.
This Note reviews case law at the federal and state levels to determine what limits appellate courts have placed on that discretion and what factors trial courts have considered relevant to its exercise. It then argues for a unifying two-step framework for judicial rejection of plea agreements. First, trial courts would adopt a rebuttable presumption in favor of rejecting such agreements. Second, the trial court would determine whether the parties have rebutted that presumption, considering prosecutorial prerogatives, the defendant’s autonomy and rights, the public interest in participating in the criminal legal system, and the views of any alleged victims. By working within this framework, trial courts could enhance the consistency and predictability of judicial rejections of plea agreements for all stakeholders in the criminal legal system.
Creating a Safer Haven: A Post-Dobbs Proposal for a Model Infant Safe Haven Law
Rachel M. Wagner
Following a rash of headlines about infant abandonments in the 1990s, every state passed a Safe Haven Law (SHL) which permits the anonymous surrender of infants to a safe place, like a hospital. Over 4,000 infants have been surrendered in the last quarter century. SHLs received renewed attention after Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health (the 2022 case that overturned Roe v. Wade and eliminated the constitutional protection for
abortion), where they were cited in both oral argument and the majority opinion. Following Dobbs, nearly two dozen states enacted abortion bans or restrictions and subsequently saw an increase in their birthrates. At the same time, the idea of Baby Boxes—devices placed on the outside of hospitals and fire stations where an infant can be surrendered without a face-to-face encounter—gained traction. Many state legislatures have reacted to Dobbs and the Baby Box trend by re-evaluating their SHLs.
This Note evaluates current SHLs and makes recommendations for a Model Safe Haven Law to instruct states on how to best support mothers and infants in crisis as they update their statutes. Part I explains the data on infanticide and illegal infant abandonment and outlines the most significant shortcomings and strengths of SHLs thus far. Part II proceeds to analyze five key elements of SHLs: the maximum age of surrender, surrender locations, anonymity, parental rights, and criminal liability. Part III offers evidence-based recommendations in the form of a model law to help SHLs fulfill their promises of reducing illegal infant abandonment and supporting families in crisis.
Set It in Stone: Patagonia and the Evolution toward Stakeholder Governance in Social Enterprise Business Structures
Ray Lu
In September 2022, outdoor apparel company Patagonia captured national attention when it announced that a specially designed trust and nonprofit would own and oversee the private for-profit corporation. Patagonia’s novel structure, rooted in the concept of steward-ownership, uses a trust to create a mechanism for direct stakeholder governance. A longstanding proponent of business as a means for social good, Patagonia and its new configuration represent the latest structural development in the world of “social enterprises”—defined as companies that aim to achieve positive social or environmental impact along with financial sustainability or gain. Social enterprises were traditionally organized as conventional for-profit entities before the introduction of new hybrid structures such as low-profit liability companies and public benefit corporations. Even these newer options, however, have limitations to integrating the perspectives of non-shareholder stakeholders, leading to skepticism that these entities would pursue or meet their social impact goals.
This Note examines the steward-ownership model in the context of Patagonia and the social enterprise movement more broadly, identifying a trend in using business structures to legitimize social impact goals and foster credibility. The trust and nonprofit structure help separate economic incentives from decision-making authority and legally codifies an avenue for non-shareholder stakeholders to influence the operations of a social enterprise. Part I introduces social enterprises, including the different business structures available to impact-oriented companies. Part II discusses steward-ownership and the use of trusts in social enterprise business structures, comparing Patagonia’s new structure to existing options. Part III examines the implications of steward-ownership, highlighting concerns but finding that the model provides a strong form of stakeholder governance while maintaining the flexibility to incorporate other dimensions of social enterprise innovation. The analysis concludes that steward-ownership models are a definitive, sequential improvement in the use of business structures by social enterprises to reshape business into a force for positive social change.
Nomos and Narrative in New York: Expanding Religious Liberty Rights, Hasidic Yeshivas, and New York Education Law
Samuel B. Hainbach
In 1983, Robert Cover challenged the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach to conflicts between the law of the state and the religious commitments of “insular communities.” Over 40 years later, Cover’s call remains urgent, and is of special relevance in New York. In Brooklyn and the Lower Hudson Valley, Hasidic yeshivas with tens of thousands of students seek dispensation from state policy that requires all students to receive a basic secular education. Meanwhile, federal religious liberty jurisprudence, significantly changed since 1983, still fails to satisfyingly arbitrate between the commitments of religious communities and the law of the secular state.
Part I of this Note sets the theoretical and doctrinal stage. It explains the intervention made by Professor Cover in Nomos and Narrative, outlines the free exercise maximalism of today’s Supreme Court, and proposes how Cover’s ideas could be used to redeem a religious liberty jurisprudence gone awry. Specifically, as part of determining when the law of the insular religious community must bend before the law of the state, Part I argues that courts should inquire into whether the state’s law is paideic (world-creating) or merely regulatory. Part II applies these ideas to the pressing case study of Hasidic education in New York. It provides the reader with an overview of Hasidic education and the current legal landscape. It also cautions that current doctrine is ill-equipped to handle the dilemma. Finally, Part III encourages New York government to articulate its compulsory education law as a world-creating commitment of the state and urges the courts to recognize the legitimacy and necessity of such a claim.