By Esteban Gutierrez-Alvarez
The tension between state constitutional provisions promising municipal self-governance and the reality of state legislative supremacy creates a fundamental paradox at the heart of home rule doctrine. Cities across America face unprecedented governance challenges—from economic transformation to climate adaptation—while remaining constrained by a legal framework that forces them to navigate either unpredictable judicial interpretation or the political minefield of legislative preemption. As municipalities attempt to address pressing local needs through home rule authority, they frequently encounter institutional obstacles that undermine their constitutional promise of local autonomy. This Note argues that state administrative agencies should superintend home rule disputes between municipalities and state legislatures. By establishing administrative processes as venues for structured negotiation between competing authorities, states could provide municipalities with greater procedural predictability while ensuring policy consistency at the state level. Administrative superintendence would preserve meaningful local autonomy while ensuring municipalities exercise their powers within coherent statewide frameworks suited for twenty-first century challenges.
Part I traces the parallel evolution of home rule doctrine and state administrative authority, revealing how both systems represent legislative delegations that have developed along markedly different paths of institutional power. Part II examines Massachusetts’s rigid hierarchical control over home rule, demonstrating how formalistic approaches fail to address the complex intergovernmental relationships characteristic of modern governance. Part III proposes a theory of administrative superintendence that would integrate agencies into home rule frameworks, leveraging their hybrid judicial-legislative functions, specialized expertise, and capacity for ongoing supervision.