By Jeffrey Fastow
For more than a century, the federal courts have improvised their way through the overseas territories—sometimes treating them as states, sometimes as colonies, and often as something in between. This Note argues that this uncertainty is not merely historical but structural. Territorial courts, grounded under Article IV rather than Article III, require a distinct mode of judicial review: one bounded by political-question restraint and informed by administrative deference, rather than by analogy to state sovereignty. In particular, when territorial courts interpret their own organic acts or territorial statutes, such disputes should be understood as political questions textually committed to Congress under the Territory Clause and lacking judicially manageable standards. And even when courts believe review is appropriate, judges should afford territorial interpretations Skidmore-style respect—measured by expertise, consistency, and reasoned judgment—much as they once did to agency interpretations of delegated authority. The result is an account of Article IV-modulated review that preserves Marbury’s core commitments, while insulating the territories from the ad hoc interventions that have long characterized America’s law of expansionism.