By Edmund A. Costikyan
In our criminal justice system, it is now a matter of little note that the vast majority of cases are resolved by guilty plea rather than at trial, without a single fact ever presented to a jury. Since the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, it has become common practice for plea agreements to require not only that a defendant waive her right to trial by pleading guilty, but also that she waive her right to ever appeal her conviction or sentence. This Note explores the waiver of appellate rights from both a due process and public policy standpoint, arguing ultimately that when a defendant faces a potential death sentence at any point during the adjudication of her case, her appellate rights cannot be constitutionally waived; additionally, that in both the interest of justice and the public interest, such waivers should not be sought or upheld.
Part II of this Note introduces the relevant background of the plea bargaining system and the use of appellate waivers. Part III discusses the issues raised both when a defendant is asked to waive her appellate rights and by the enforcement of such waivers once effected, before addressing the arguable benefits of such waivers. Finally, Part IV seats these arguments in the context of capital punishment, where, due to the finality of the punishment and its powerful coercive force, the unreviewability of a conviction is at the highest level of concern.